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ver the course of the past fi ve years, maritime piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia has been on the rise as the country has spiraled deeper and deeper into 
anarchy.1 The United States responded in late 2008 and early 2009 with a variety 
of counterpiracy measures, ranging from strengthening the multinational naval 
presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to the signing of a memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) with Kenya to facilitate the prosecution of suspected 
pirates. However, despite assertions that lawlessness on land allows maritime 
piracy to emerge, present counterpiracy methods have failed to address poor 
governance and instability within Somalia. Instead, they have dealt only with 
the sea-based manifestations of land-based malaise. Ideally, a sustainable coun-
terpiracy strategy would address root causes as well as symptoms, in both the 
short and long terms. By disaggregating Somalia’s maritime insecurity from the 
insecurity it suffers on land, the United States and its international partners may 
well be unable to achieve a sustainable solution to piracy.
This article outlines the causal logic that led to the 
spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in re-
cent years. It will then, after an overview of the na-
ture of maritime piracy in this region, highlight the 
counterpiracy methods employed by the United States 
and assess their prospects for success or failure. It will 
conclude by proposing a comprehensive and sustain-
able counterpiracy strategy that targets both the root 
causes of piracy and the symptoms that emerge from 
lawlessness on land. 
Lesley Anne Warner is an analyst at CNA’s Center for 
Strategic Studies, in Alexandria, Virginia, where she 
focuses on African security issues, including maritime 
piracy and the U.S. Navy’s growing engagement with 
African countries. She holds an MA in security studies 
from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. She is also 
the author of an article on Somali piracy in the Janu-
ary/February 2010 issue of the Journal of Interna-
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UNDERSTANDING PIRACY AS A SYMPTOM OF LAWLESSNESS ON 
LAND
Since maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is a result of the absence of gover-
nance on land projected out to sea, the unremedied collapse of the Somali state 
will be an insurmountable obstacle to a sustainable counterpiracy strategy. So-
malia has been in a persistent anarchic state since 1991, when General Mohamed 
Siad Barre was overthrown and the country descended into clan-based civil war 
for control of the government. Eventually, the Somali state collapsed, destroy-
ing social services and the security-sector institutions that might have protected 
the country, its resources, and its citizens against internal and external threats.2 
The lack of governance and human security created a permissive environment 
on land and at sea that offered Somalis not only incentives to participate in 
criminal enterprises but also sanctuaries from which to do so. Given Soma-
lia’s proximity to one of the world’s main sea lines of communications through 
the Gulf of Aden, Somali fi shermen, unrestrained by a functioning coast guard 
or navy, seized the opportunity to engage in maritime piracy starting in the 
1990s—initially claiming to be protecting Somali waters from foreign vessels 
that were fi shing illegally off the country’s coast.3 (Current estimates state that 
more than three hundred million dollars’ worth of fi sh is stolen each year from 
Somali waters.)4
To put piracy off the coast of Somalia in its contemporary context, pirate 
attacks off the coast of Somalia have increased overall during the course of the 
past fi ve years, as shown below on fi gure 1.
However, pirate attacks decreased in 2006, which many analysts attribute to 
the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in the middle of that year. The ICU 
was an umbrella movement comprising various factions that had gained control 
of much of south and central Somalia, essentially providing a degree of gov-
ernance that had not existed in these regions since 1991. Asserting that it ran 
contrary to Islamic law, the ICU declared a war on piracy during the latter half 
of 2006. As a result of the ICU’s grasp on power, attacks on maritime vessels 
dropped during these six months of relative order.5 However, this relative order 
was short-lived, as extremist elements within the ICU provoked a confl ict with 
Ethiopia, as a result of which Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006 and 
the ICU lost control over the territory it had previously controlled. Pirate attacks 
subsequently increased in early 2007 and continue to plague the region to the 
present day.6 
This chronic lack of governance on land and resultant absence of maritime 
security spurred a rash of pirate attacks that escalated in frequency, range, and 
cost to global maritime commerce in 2008, as pirate attacks off the coast of 
Somalia accounted for 111 of the 293 reported incidents of piracy worldwide.7 
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In 2009, attacks in this region accounted for 217 out of 406 attacks worldwide.8 
Attempted and successful pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia by month in 
2009 are detailed in fi gure 2.
The trends that appear to be emerging suggest that pirates in this region 
have been able to adapt rapidly to their changing environment. In 2009, pirates 
greatly expanded their range of operations, operating as far north as Oman and 
as far south as the Seychelles and Madagascar, attacking up to 1,100 miles from 
Somalia’s coast. In addition, to decrease the chance of detection, pirates have 
increasingly operated at night.9
U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERPIRACY POLICY
Recent American maritime security strategy and policy documents related to 
piracy include but are not limited to the United States Maritime Security (Piracy) 
Policy (released in 2007 as a new annex, “Policy for the Repression of Piracy and 
Other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea,” to the 2005 National Strategy for Mari-
time Security) and Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action 
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FIGURE 1
PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 2005–2009
Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.
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Plan, published in 2008.10 The Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy identifi es piracy 
as a threat to national security, associating it with such other forms of maritime 
insecurity as illegal fi shing, smuggling, and terrorism and urging that it be ad-
dressed within a multilateral and interagency policy framework. The Partner-
ship and Action Plan outlines three lines of action to repress piracy—preventing 
pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain, interrupt-
ing acts of piracy, and holding pirates accountable by prosecuting them.11 
The week following the MV Maersk Alabama incident in April 2009, Secre-
tary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton articulated a new counterpiracy strategy.12 
It included developing an expanded and better-coordinated multinational re-
sponse, exploring the tracking and freezing of pirate assets, working with the 
shipping industry to address gaps in self-defense measures, and engaging diplo-
matically with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and authori-
ties in Puntland to combat piracy in their territories.13 Finally, it addressed im-
provement in Somalia’s capacity to police its own territory, assistance to Somali 
authorities in cracking down on pirate bases, and reduction of incentives for 
Somalis to engage in piracy.14
FIGURE 2
SUCCESSFUL AND ATTEMPTED PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009
Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.
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In spite of the evolving contemporary U.S. maritime security strategy and its 
efforts to explore diplomatic, military, economic, and legal means by which to 
combat piracy, specifi c counterpiracy methods have thus far been unbalanced, 
with more emphasis placed on addressing the symptoms of instability on land 
than on the actual conditions that allowed lawlessness on land to create lawless-
ness at sea. Nonetheless, it appears that the United States is gradually recogniz-
ing the need to adapt to the limitations of current policies and turn its coun-
terpiracy strategy in the direction of conceptually linking efforts to eliminate 
insecurity at sea with those to eliminate insecurity on land. 
POTENTIAL COUNTERPIRACY METHODS
Eight counterpiracy methods are either currently in use or under consideration 
by the United States:
Accepting piracy as a cost of doing business•
Tracing and targeting pirate fi nances•
Increasing the defenses of merchant vessels•
Addressing legal impediments to combating piracy•
Continuing multinational naval patrols•
Pursuing kinetic operations on land •
Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity•
Building local and regional security-sector capacity on land.•
The following pages examine these methods, assessing the strengths and weak-
nesses of each. 
Accepting Piracy as a Cost of Doing Business
In 2009, of the approximately thirty thousand vessels that pass through the 
Gulf of Aden every year, 217 were attacked. Of these, only forty-seven were suc-
cessfully hijacked.15 Given that only 0.72 percent of the ships that traversed the 
gulf were attacked in 2009, it is easy to argue that the international community 
should simply accept the payment of ransoms to pirates in this region as an 
added business expense.
Despite the fact that there is no universally accepted method for enumer-
ating the various costs of piracy, several analysts have attempted to assess the 
cost of piracy to global maritime commerce. Contemporary estimates range be-
tween $500 million and $25 billion per year.16 The burdens imposed on govern-
ments and the shipping industry by piracy are often passed on to taxpayers and
consumers:
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Rerouting ships to bypass pirate-infested waters such as the Gulf of Aden, •
adding three thousand miles and from two to three weeks to voyages, 
incurring additional fuel costs of $3.5 million per year for tankers and $74.4 
million per year for the liner trades
Opting to pay higher insurance premiums, which have increased from only •
fi ve hundred dollars in 2007 to approximately $20,000 per ship per voyage, 
excluding injury, liability, and ransom coverage
Paying ransoms, totaling between $30 million and $150 million in 2008•
Paying ransom-delivery costs, negotiation fees, and lawyer fees•
Hiring licensed private security guards (up to $60,000 for the voyage through •
the Gulf of Aden), as well as absorbing the additional insurance costs 
associated with embarked security teams or armed sailors
Installing nonlethal deterrent equipment and employing personnel to •
operate it, at a cost of $20,000 to $30,000
Paying higher wages to crews of vessels transiting waters where pirate attacks •
are considered likely
Sustaining a multinational naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian •
Ocean, at a cost of between $250 million and $400 million per year.17
To put these fi gures into context, global maritime commerce ranges in the 
trillions of dollars, so current estimates of losses to piracy are comparatively 
small.18 Nonetheless, continued piracy off the coast of Somalia poses a grave 
threat to global maritime commerce because of the country’s proximity to the 
Gulf of Aden, which is a major sea line of communication. With the opportu-
nity to target any of the thirty thousand vessels that transit the Gulf of Aden 
every year, pirate attacks would not only continue, but also escalate in range, fre-
quency, and possibly even lethality due to the opportunity for high and reliable 
profi ts from continued ransom payments and the lack of suffi cient deterrents 
to continuing such activity. Ransoms paid to pirates operating off the coast of 
Somalia have increased from 2004 to the present—from about $500,000 per ves-
sel to upwards of $5.5 million.19 Pirates have learned quickly that publicity pays. 
For example, publicity from the fall 2008 hijackings of the MV Faina and the 
MV Sirius Star, large ships with controversial or valuable cargoes, enabled the 
pirates to negotiate higher ransoms—a process for which a clear, yet elaborate, 
mechanism has been established.20 
Continued piracy off the coast of Somalia also has negative implications for 
other littoral states, especially for Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen, whose port cit-
ies may receive fewer port calls as a result. Additionally, continued attacks have 
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negative effects on Egypt, in terms of forgone revenue from vessels that would 
have passed through the Suez Canal and paid tolls but decided not to transit the 
pirate-infested Gulf of Aden.21 Furthermore, inland markets in East and Central 
Africa that depend on imports from ports on the Indian Ocean may also face 
increased costs when many of their economies are struggling to recover from 
the recent global fi nancial crisis. Finally, continued pirate attacks off the coast 
of Somalia risk disrupting the United Nations World Food Programme’s (UN 
WFP) food shipments to Somalia—90 percent of which are delivered by sea, to 
feed a third of the nation’s population.22
Naturally, one option would be for shipping companies that own hijacked 
vessels to refuse to pay ransoms. By paying ransoms these companies contribute 
to further destabilization of the region, because the infl ux of cash enables war-
lords to continue their confl icts on land. Additionally, concerns have emerged 
regarding the possibility that pirates might cultivate ties to terrorist groups that 
may be affi liated with al-Qa‘ida such as al-Shabaab—albeit out of convenience, 
not shared ideology.23 However, prohibiting payment of ransoms by shipping 
companies may be impractical, because these companies could face pressure 
from politicians, the media, and the families of captured sailors to pay in order 
to ensure the safety of the crews and cargoes of hijacked ships.24
Tracing and Targeting Pirate Finances
Pirate gangs operating out of Somalia derive funding, among other benefi ts, 
from an extensive network of support.25 One way to erode this network could be 
to trace and target pirate fi nances, much as is being done to counter other illicit 
activities, such as drug traffi cking and terrorism.
Investigation of pirate fi nances would reveal information concerning the 
structures of pirate gangs, relationships within and among them, and their do-
mestic and foreign fi nanciers. Targeting pirate fi nances might erode some of 
the active or tacit support pirates gain from spreading money to local offi cials 
and relatives, who then become part of the pirates’ logistical and intelligence 
networks.26 Since piracy in this region is a crime of economic incentives and not 
one of ideology, once the money dries up, this support network is likely to do the 
same. Integral to this approach would be increased information sharing regard-
ing pirate fi nancials among local, regional, and international partners.
A limitation of tracing and targeting pirate fi nances, however, is that not all 
ransoms are paid through formal banking processes. In fact, some involve the 
transfer of money through informal channels that leave no paper trail; some 
have even been paid in cash, parachuted onto the decks of hijacked vessels. Ap-
plying pressure on such informal banking methods could have the unfortunate 
and unintended consequence of driving them farther underground, making 
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them more diffi cult to trace. The question also arises as to whether authorities 
in Somalia or even regional states are capable of targeting and seizing pirate as-
sets.27 Some government offi cials in Somalia and abroad have been accused of 
complicity in networked pirate activity, raising the prospect of pirate gangs be-
ing tipped off in time to protect their assets. The country’s cash-based economy 
also poses challenges for tracking ransoms or start-up logistical money from So-
mali businessmen.28 Finally, pirates have proved to be adaptive, and it is safe to 
assume that they will learn to adapt to the tracing and targeting of their fi nances 
until the underlying economic incentives—for the pirates and for the commu-
nities that provide them sanctuary—are eliminated once and for all.29
Increasing the Defenses of Merchant Vessels
The shipping industry has been an integral part of the search for a counterpiracy 
strategy. In January 2009 representatives of twenty-four countries held the inau-
gural meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, creating 
four working groups.30 Working Group 3 is led by the United States, with the 
support of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and is working to 
strengthen shipping industry self-awareness, security, and commercial industry 
coordination. The Contact Group now has nearly forty countries and interna-
tional organizations as members or observers, including the United Nations, 
the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
the African Union (AU), and the IMO. In February 2009 representatives of the 
international shipping industry released a document of best management prac-
tices, advising vessels transiting affl icted areas on how to avoid, deter, or delay 
pirate attacks.31 Finally, at the Contact Group’s May 2009 meeting, Panama, Li-
beria, the Bahamas, and the Marshall Islands—whose fl ag registries together 
comprise more than half of the world’s shipping by gross tonnage—signed the 
New York Declaration, stating that they agreed to promulgate best practices to 
protect ships against pirate attacks.32 
Thus far, nonlethal ship protection against pirate attacks has evolved to in-
clude increased surveillance; transit of piracy-prone areas at night, utilizing night 
vision equipment for early detection of pirate skiffs; frequent course changes 
and evasive maneuvers; transit in convoys, possibly escorted by warships, or 
at least in frequent contact with them; operational communications security 
protocols preventing disclosure on radio channels of cargoes, intended routes, 
or the presence or absence of onboard security, in order to prevent intelligence-
driven attacks; use of maximum safe speeds; rehearsal of lockdown procedures 
and seclusion of crews in the pilothouse out of the reach of pirates; the lining 
of ships with netting, barbed wire, or electric fencing; the spraying of slippery 
foam on deck in the event of attack; and onboard training teams for nonlethal 
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response techniques, such as long-range acoustic devices, lasers, fl ares, micro-
waves, and water hoses.33 
Increasing the defenses of merchant vessels generally is certainly a step in 
the right direction, since it provides some degree of protection for ships that 
have been relatively vulnerable. Particularly, nonlethal techniques have been so 
successful that 80 percent of attempted pirate attacks are now foiled without as-
sistance from warships on patrol.34 Nevertheless, they have limitations: they can 
still represent delaying tactics at best for the remaining 20 percent of merchant 
vessels that were successfully hijacked; also, crew members operating them are 
often vulnerable to fi re from heavily armed pirates. In contrast, lethal defenses, 
such as fi rearms, could have a deterrent effect on the calculations of pirates, who 
might consider the risks of death or capture higher if they know that merchant 
vessels may be armed. Possibilities that have been broached are training and 
equipping seamen with small arms and embarking private security teams on 
board merchant vessels transiting pirate-infested waters. 
In June 2009 the House of Representatives proposed two bills designed to in-
crease the security of U.S.-fl ag vessels against pirates. An amendment to House 
Resolution 2647 (signed into law in October 2009 as the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010), requires the Department of Defense to 
place military personnel on the approximately fi fty-four U.S.-fl ag vessels that 
carry weapons or military supplies through the waters off the Horn of Africa 
each year, in order to prevent military equipment from falling into the hands of 
pirates. This requirement will last until either 30 September 2011 or when the 
Secretary of Defense notifi es Congress that there is no longer a credible piracy 
threat to U.S.-fl ag vessels carrying government cargo—whichever comes ear-
lier.35 House Resolution 2984, the “Mariner and Vessel Protection Act,” in com-
mittee at this writing, would allow vessels carrying arms to enter international 
ports, authorize the embarkation of Coast Guard maritime safety and security 
teams on U.S.-fl ag ships transiting pirate-infested waters, and grant immunity 
to civilian sailors who, having received fi rearms training from the Coast Guard, 
wound or kill pirates during attacks.36
On the downside, arming seamen or embarking security teams on merchant 
vessels presents a new set of questions. First, arming merchant vessels may well 
escalate the violence of pirate attacks by encouraging gangs to invest in the qual-
ity and quantity of weapons and to alter their calculations with regard to the use 
of force.37 Second, arming crews poses safety and training issues and offers no 
guarantee that they would be profi cient enough to fend off heavily armed pi-
rates.38 Third, there may be increased insurance costs associated with embarked 
security teams or armed sailors, and the shipping industry may calculate that 
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it is cheaper to pay ransoms on the odd chance that a ship does get successfully 
hijacked.39 Fourth, many international ports do not allow armed merchant ves-
sels to enter, although this obstacle could be overcome by dispatching armed 
security teams in separate escort ships, which would stay at sea. Finally, arming 
merchant vessels raises legal and liability issues, specifi cally as they pertain to 
whether recognized governmental authorities will provide armed protection or 
whether the task will be outsourced to private security fi rms. The latter opens 
the door for very complicated debates regarding rules of engagement, jurisdic-
tion over captured pirates, and the oversight and regulation of private security 
counterpiracy operations.
Addressing Legal Impediments to Combating Piracy 
The current legal framework for addressing maritime piracy has been one of 
the many impediments to combating piracy, with regard to how it addresses is-
sues of state sovereignty, rules of engagement, jurisdiction, and “persons under 
control” (PUCs).40 Compounding these diffi culties is the fact that the Somali 
government is incapable of providing its own legal deterrent to piracy. Nor can 
other states in the region process the number of pirates apprehended by navies 
patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and 
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation collectively establish the defi nition of modern piracy and 
the basis of the legal framework, including provisions to render suspected pi-
rates to littoral states (if they are signatories to these conventions) where attacks 
take place. In addition, between June 2008 and December 2009 six UN Security 
Council resolutions were passed urging states to use the necessary means in 
conformity with international law for the repression of acts of piracy, including 
authorization for states cooperating with the TFG to enter Somali land or ter-
ritorial waters to combat piracy.41 
Among the many impediments that remain is the fact that multinational na-
val patrols off the coast of Somalia have occasionally been obliged to “catch and 
release” suspected pirates after confi scating their weapons and skiffs, because 
no nations would accept them for trial. In some of these countries, penal codes 
do not treat piracy as a punishable offence; other countries can arrest suspected 
pirates only if their own interests are directly affected.42 Compounding these 
challenges, jurisdiction can be diffi cult to determine, because several countries 
might be affected by an actual or attempted act of piracy, such as the vessel’s fl ag 
state, the state of the company that owns the vessel, the state of the company that 
owns the cargo, the states of which crew members are nationals, and the state of 
the warship that disrupted the attack.43
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The alternative, prosecuting pirates outside the region—in the United States 
or in Europe, for example—would bring its own set of complications. Whether 
trials of suspected pirates are held in the region of the attacks or further abroad, 
adherence to international norms of human rights means that countries that 
accept pirates for prosecution must ensure that suspects are not detained for 
long periods of time, which could be a problem for countries with overburdened 
legal systems or for cases that require the transport of pirates, witnesses, and 
evidence over long distances.44 Additionally, suspected pirates may claim asy-
lum if brought to Europe or the United States, asserting that their lives would 
be endangered by the continual warfare and desperate human conditions they 
would face should they be found innocent and returned to Somalia.45 This latter 
factor threatens the legal deterrent effect that an enhanced international legal 
framework should ideally have. 
One solution to these impediments would be to strengthen the ability of re-
gional states’ judicial systems to investigate and prosecute suspected pirates and 
to incarcerate those convicted. Kenya has signed MOUs with the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the EU to prosecute captured pirates in 
their court systems on a case-by-case basis. Regional states have also explored 
the possibility of assembling teams of law enforcement ship riders that can 
board warships, begin criminal investigations at sea, arrest suspected pirates in 
the name of the teams’ countries, and then send them for trial in those nations 
in order to address some of the problems with PUCs, jurisdiction, and regional 
legal capacity.46 Such initiatives could be supported through capacity-building 
activities coordinated by the U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments 
(LEDETs) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) teams support-
ing Combined Task Force 151 (discussed below). Finally, an international tri-
bunal for prosecuting pirates could resolve many of the jurisdictional problems 
that have arisen, make trials more effi cient, and speed up prosecutions that 
would have burdened the underdeveloped judicial systems of regional states.47
The evolution of an international legal framework to combat piracy is a posi-
tive development, because it seeks to bolster the presently weak legal deterrent 
for current and prospective pirates. Kenya, in exchange for agreeing to try some 
of the suspected pirates, will receive assistance to strengthen its judicial system, 
which should have the broader benefi t of expanding the country’s capacity to 
enforce the rule of law and address other threats to security and stability. This 
method, if applied to other regional states, could have similar impact on their 
judicial systems. 
However, as things stand now, prosecution of suspected pirates in regional 
countries may present bureaucratic and fi nancial burdens, clogging jails and 
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courts and even fomenting social unrest. For instance, Kenya’s judicial system 
is engulfed in a debate over whether to prosecute those who instigated violence 
following the 2007 presidential election; allegedly, the country’s judicial system 
already has a backlog of cases.48 In addition, Kenya may wish not to be a dump-
ing ground for captured pirates, because making it the centerpiece of pirate 
prosecution efforts could infl ame the country’s Somali refugee population, as 
well as its own Muslim population.49
Continuing Multinational Naval Patrols 
In support of UN Security Council resolutions passed in 2008 and 2009 in re-
sponse to the rise in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, the United States and 
several international partner nations began to increase air and sea patrols of the 
areas where attacks were most likely to take place. In August 2008, the United 
States established a movable Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) along the 
Yemeni coast to allow a limited number of warships to protect a greater number 
of merchant vessels by concentrating the vessels in number and proximity. In 
January 2009, ships from over twenty nations joined or otherwise cooperated 
with Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) to engage in counterpiracy operations 
in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden. CTF 
151 is one of three task forces of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a coalition 
of over twenty countries operating in a 2.5-million-square-mile area.50 CMF 
had been established in February 2002 by U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command 
to “deter destabilizing activities to create a lawful maritime order by defeating 
terrorism, deterring piracy, reducing illegal traffi cking of people and drugs as 
well as promoting the maritime environment as a safe place for mariners with 
legitimate business.”51 In order to increase the effectiveness of coordination on 
counterpiracy measures at sea, CMF hosts Shared Awareness and Deconfl iction 
(SHADE), which involves regular workshop-style meetings of staff-level offi cers 
from the various operational headquarters. SHADE is designed to provide op-
portunities for navies to share information, streamline tactics, and ensure that 
assets are used effi ciently and with the desired effect.52 
In February 2009, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
(IRTC), extending 464 miles along the southern coast of Yemen and the north-
ern coast of Somalia, became operational, and coalition warships began to es-
cort merchant vessels through it. The area off the coast of Somalia is patrolled 
by approximately thirty warships contributed by CMF, the EU’s Operation ATA-
LANTA, NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD, and navies from such countries as 
Russia, India, China, Iran, and Japan.53 In addition, the United States and its 
partners monitor pirate activity on the high seas; conduct visit, board, search, 
and seizure (VBSS) of suspected pirate skiffs; and provide surveillance of vessels 
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that have been hijacked—much as USS Bainbridge and Boxer did during the 
Maersk Alabama incident. 
As both the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have the authority to conduct coun-
terpiracy operations, CTF 151 is supported by both Coast Guard law enforcement 
detachments and teams of NCIS personnel on board ships in order to address 
some of the legal impediments to combating piracy that have arisen.54 LEDETs 
are responsible for supplementing Navy VBSS teams in maritime interdiction 
operations, training them on issues concerning maritime law, boarding poli-
cies and procedures, evidence collection and preparation, and safe and humane 
treatment of suspects. Upon encountering a suspected pirate vessel, air and sea 
assets attempt to compel it to allow boarding.55 A LEDET team goes on board 
fi rst, to secure and search the skiff, preserve evidence, and radio its assessment 
of the situation. Once the vessel is secured, an NCIS team joins the LEDET, and 
together they perform a crime-scene investigation, collecting, logging, and se-
curing evidence so as to ensure chain of custody until it can be handed over to a 
judicial authority. If the CTF 151 commander determines that there is suffi cient 
evidence to prosecute, suspected pirates are detained until they can be rendered 
for trial in a state willing to accept them.56
A naval presence off the coast of Somalia presumably forces pirates to project 
their attacks farther out to sea, aside from disrupting or deterring attacks where 
warships are close enough to protect threatened vessels. Additionally, depend-
ing on weather, naval patrols can be scaled back between May and September 
and from December to March, when Indian Ocean monsoons produce swells 
reaching ten to fi fteen feet and pirate skiffs cannot effectively stalk vulnerable 
merchant vessels. (However, pirate attacks tend to increase following periods of 
poor weather conditions.)57 Finally, a measure that has not been taken thus far 
but may be under consideration is the establishment of a maritime exclusion 
zone adjacent to the Somali coastline.58 
Despite the palpable deterrent that a naval presence represents, pirates ap-
pear to have developed a fair understanding of the gaps in naval capabilities. 
Notwithstanding the MSPA, IRTC, and the patrols of warships from over twenty 
navies, pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in 2009 still accounted for over 
half of the attacks worldwide.59 However, on average the success rate for pirate 
attacks for this time period was just over 21 percent, compared with 40 percent 
for the year 2008.60 Success rates by month in 2009 are detailed in fi gure 3.
Although pirate attacks had lower rates of success in 2009 than in 2008, coali-
tion maritime forces on the whole simply do not have enough warships to patrol 
off the coast of Somalia and protect the tens of thousands of ships that traverse 
these waters annually. Responding to an analysis positing that it would take a 
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force over three times the size of the entire U.S. Navy to fi ght piracy effectively, 
Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that 
the Navy has other pressing priorities as well, in other parts of the world.61 Fur-
thermore, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead has pointed 
to a need for counterpiracy approaches that complement naval patrols, such as 
the combined sea and shore strategy that was so instrumental in curbing piracy 
in the Strait of Malacca earlier this decade.62 Both the attack trends and the 
statements of Navy leadership highlight the limitations inherent in a purely na-
val approach to countering piracy.63
There are specifi c operational diffi culties as well. For example, it has been 
estimated that escorting merchant vessels between the Red Sea and Mombasa 
alone would require seventy-two ships—more than currently operate in the en-
tire region at any given time.64 In any case, organizing convoys under escort 
would compel merchant ships to follow schedules that may not meet market re-
quirements.65 Since convoys move at the speed of the slowest member, a contain-
ership would have to travel as slowly as a tanker.66 Finally, for many countries, 
contributing to a sustained naval presence off the coast of Somalia is extremely 
costly and plagued by logistic hurdles.
FIGURE 3
SUCCESS RATES OF PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009
Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.
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Pursuing Kinetic Operations on Land
One of the options to consider in order to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia 
might include a range of kinetic methods targeting the land-based aspects of pi-
racy. On the lower end of the scale, the international community could mobilize 
to launch air strikes or amphibious raids designed to dismantle pirates’ bases 
and infrastructure and to destroy their ability to launch attacks out at sea. At 
the higher end, surgical air strikes could be followed by military occupation of 
the territories from which pirates launch their attacks, providing security (and 
eventually enabling governance) and preventing pirates from operating.
The unequivocal attractiveness of kinetic methods applied ashore lies in the 
argument that as pirates and their support networks reside ashore, they should 
be targeted there. Furthermore, a credible threat of military force could compel 
Somali clan leaders and businessmen to clamp down on pirate activity, reducing 
it to a level that may turn a profi t but that the international community may be 
willing to ignore.67 
In reality, the United States is unlikely to launch air strikes or send in troops 
for several reasons.68 First, attacks on pirate bases or an outright military oc-
cupation would certainly undermine President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s TFG, 
which already has plenty of obstacles to overcome. Even with—or especially 
with—the consent of the TFG, an American attack could provoke greater sup-
port among the population for the pirate gangs or even for ideological groups 
like al-Shabaab. Second, there is resistance within the United States to reengag-
ing militarily on land in Somalia, as a result of the October 1993 Black Hawk 
Down incident, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed while support-
ing the United Nations Operation in Somalia, known as UNOSOM II, which 
was attempting to avert a humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Third, there appears 
to be insuffi cient intelligence to allow pirate infrastructure to be targeted with-
out infl icting civilian casualties, which could further destabilize the country 
and energize al-Shabaab.69 Fourth, international norms of human rights dictate 
that the United States could not simply kill suspected pirates encountered but 
would have to develop a method to capture them, put them on trial within an 
acceptable and humane amount of time, and incarcerate those convicted, which 
raises legal complications similar to those already discussed. Lastly, were there 
to be any sort of military intervention, Western humanitarian relief organiza-
tions currently providing services that the Somali government has been unable 
to offer since 1991 could be targeted for reprisals.70
Building Local and Regional Maritime Security–Sector Capacity
Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity may provide a 
deterrent against pirate attacks, fi nally making pirates accountable for their 
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destabilizing activities. To make these countries capable of contributing to mar-
itime security in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, the United States and its 
partners could enhance their engagement with maritime security–sector insti-
tutions in Somalia and neighboring littoral countries, such as Djibouti, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Yemen.
Somalia has already requested assistance in the form of training and equip-
ment from the international community to establish a coast guard to help tackle 
piracy. The TFG has also been training fi ve hundred young men to serve in the 
Somali navy, which its chief hopes will eventually have fi ve thousand men.71 
However, training has thus far taken place on land, since the force has no op-
erational ships. Although Somalia would like to provide for its own maritime 
security, its transitional government is likely to be preoccupied in the short term 
with staving off defeat by various insurgent groups and gaining control of its 
own capital city.72 Consequently, the maritime security gap will have to be fi lled 
by regional and international partners in the meantime.
Regrettably, however, most countries in the region are currently ill equipped 
to provide maritime security even for themselves, let alone Somalia; they lack 
the requisite training and equipment, and their security forces have tradition-
ally been land focused. In order to build their capacity to deal with maritime 
threats, the United States and international partners could augment security 
cooperation agreements, offering to train maritime security personnel; equip 
and assist in the maintenance of vessels; share best practices for the collection, 
sharing, and synchronization of intelligence; provide aerial surveillance; and 
coordinate multilateral naval training exercises designed to increase regional 
cooperation.73 Ideally, these countries would eventually be able to patrol with 
international partners by air and sea; conduct surveillance of the littoral zone; 
facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on possible 
maritime threats; encourage interagency and multinational cooperation; and 
harmonize maritime doctrines.74 
As a step in the right direction, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the 
Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen signed in February 
2009 a code of conduct to counter piracy, agreeing to establish counterpiracy 
information centers in Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and Sanaa and a counterpiracy 
training center in Djibouti.75 Also, in June 2009, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen agreed upon the formation of an Arab Anti-Piracy Task Force to provide 
maritime security for states in the region and enhance cooperation with multi-
national naval patrols.76 In addition, Kenya and Tanzania have pledged to start 
joint naval operations, and in the spring of 2009 the Seychelles became the fi rst 
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East African nation to assist in operations carried out by the EU’s Operation 
ATALANTA.77 
Increased coordination among regional stakeholder states could set prec-
edents for sustained regional maritime security cooperation that could be ex-
tended to other maritime security threats, such as arms traffi cking, human 
traffi cking, drug traffi cking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fi shing 
(which was arguably what drove Somali fi shermen to pursue piracy on a much 
smaller scale in the 1990s). Regardless, the present limitations of local and re-
gional maritime capacity mean that the benefi ts of such regional and interna-
tional initiatives are more likely to have concrete impact over the long term than 
in the immediate future. 
Building Local and Regional Security-Sector Capacity on Land
As a result of the security and governance vacuum in Somalia, lawlessness ashore 
is likely to continue to create lawlessness at sea unless security-sector capacity 
can be built up both in Somalia and in neighboring states. In order to build 
this capacity with the intent that these countries would increasingly contribute 
to the provision of security in the region, the United States and international 
partners could enhance engagement with local and regional security-sector in-
stitutions on land. 
Given the fact that Somalia lacks functional governing institutions to sup-
port a security sector, one will have to be built from scratch, which will require 
a costly and sustained whole of government multinational commitment. Inter-
national security assistance could equip Somalia to develop a police force and 
military supported by robust security-sector institutions that could enable the 
country to address the security and governance vacuum that allows pirates and 
insurgents to thrive. That said, the TFG is currently extremely weak, controlling 
little territory within the country it purports to govern. In the meantime, the 
United States and its partners could address capability gaps in regional partner 
nations like Kenya and Djibouti, in nations that do not share a border with So-
malia (such as Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda), and in regional and 
subregional organizations like the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development. Ideally, the regional militaries could become more able and will-
ing to build governing institutions in Somalia and help provide security there, 
in the event of a more viable and inclusive peace agreement.
However, it is for all intents and purposes impossible to disaggregate Soma-
lia’s problems, whether on land or at sea, from other confl icts in the region, such 
as the proxy war often fought on Somali soil between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and 
Ethiopia’s internal security concerns in the Ogaden region.78 Though it is impor-
tant to attempt to maintain dialogues with Ethiopia and Eritrea on the situation 
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in Somalia, it might be advisable therefore to exclude them from efforts to build 
capacity specifi cally to address instability there. Furthermore, the international 
community will have to remain sensitive to Kenya’s concerns via-à-vis its own 
internal security issues. With lucrative foreign investments, a tourism industry 
shaken by electoral violence two years ago, and almost three hundred thousand 
Somali refugees along the porous border with Somalia, Kenya takes very seri-
ously the threats issued by al-Shabaab to launch terrorist attacks in Kenya if the 
country were to become militarily involved in Somalia.79 
The international community should also consider concrete fi nancial, logis-
tical, and political support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
and any successor multinational peacekeeping forces so that they might be-
come capable of achieving their strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.80 
AMISOM was authorized by a communiqué of the sixty-ninth meeting of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, on 19 January 2007.81 One of 
just a handful of AU peacekeeping missions, AMISOM was essentially stillborn 
in the face of a challenging security environment in Somalia as well as opera-
tional and tactical setbacks. It was initially authorized for six months from the 
date of the communiqué, with a mandate (set out in paragraph nine of the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1772) that included: 
Providing support to transitional federal institutions, to help them carry out •
their functions of government
Supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia•
Providing security for key infrastructure•
Assisting with the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization •
Plan, in particular the effective reestablishment of the Somali security forces
Facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance.• 82
AMISOM’s mandate has been extended several times, most recently to 31 Janu-
ary 2011, as authorized by UN Security Resolution 1910.83 
In addition to a mandate that was restricted to self-defense and the protec-
tion of a weak and divided government, AMISOM has encountered several dif-
fi culties. AMISOM has suffered from unfulfi lled commitments made by the in-
ternational community. The original understanding was that AMISOM would 
evolve into a UN peacekeeping mission upon the expiration of its initial man-
date in June 2007, but as of early 2010 this has not occurred. AMISOM has been 
able to muster only 5,200 of its authorized troop strength of eight thousand 
soldiers, which have been contributed by Uganda and Burundi, although Nige-
ria, Ghana, and Malawi pledged troops that were never deployed. Also, the AU, 
unable to fi nance the mission on its own, had to rely on ad hoc international 
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fi nancial assistance for training and equipment, which has proved insuffi cient. 
Additionally, although initiated and staffed by African personnel, AMISOM 
was perceived in Somalia as a tool of Western interests, and its soldiers were 
consequently targeted by insurgents.84 Finally, AMISOM forces were accused of 
human rights violations, having used indiscriminate violence to defend them-
selves against attacks. Only in the spring of 2009 did AMISOM change tactics, 
returning fi re only if attackers could be visually identifi ed, but by that time their 
actions had already further alienated the population from the TFG.85 
ADEPT AND CULTURALLY SENSITIVE ENGAGEMENT
Piracy off the coast of Somalia must be analyzed in the context from which it 
emerged if a comprehensive and sustainable response is to be crafted. Piracy is 
a symptom of instability on land; as such, counterpiracy methods that focus on 
the symptoms of lawlessness on land rather than on its root causes do little to 
mitigate the conditions that allowed piracy to emerge in the fi rst place. Because 
piracy is a land-based enterprise, possible counterpiracy solutions must be as-
sessed in terms of how they would positively impact conditions ashore.
In the preceding paragraphs, the author outlined a variety of counterpiracy 
methods. Assuming pirate attacks would escalate in range, frequency, and le-
thality were they to be accepted as a cost of doing business, this option may be 
infeasible. However, the remaining methods could have a positive impact if their 
strengths are pursued in concert. In order to reach maximum effectiveness, an 
ideal counterpiracy strategy would address the catalysts of instability as well as 
its manifestations in the maritime domain.
A comprehensive and sustainable strategy to address piracy off the coast of 
Somalia would entail the United States working with regional and international 
partners to trace and target pirate fi nances, albeit with a clear understanding of 
the limitations of this approach in Somalia’s cash-based economy. Additionally, 
international stakeholders would have to be conscious of the inability of this 
method to target the underlying conditions that allowed piracy to emerge in the 
fi rst place.
The U.S. government should also maintain its engagement with the shipping 
industry, not only to make nonlethal ship defenses more effective and wide-
spread but also to explore how seamen utilizing them could make themselves 
less vulnerable while under attack. Lethal defenses of merchant vessels should be 
avoided if possible, due to the possibility of escalation of violence during pirate 
attacks, as well as the various liability and oversight issues that could arise. In 
any case, nonlethal or lethal merchant vessel defenses address only the symp-
toms of instability on land.
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To alleviate the bureaucratic and fi nancial burdens on regional states willing 
to accept suspected pirates for trial, the United States and its partners should 
support a regional ship-rider program. In addition, international stakeholders 
should emphasize building the capacity of the judicial systems in the region in 
order to bolster legal deterrents to those who wish to foment instability in So-
malia or elsewhere in the region. Above all, a reliable process by which countries 
apprehending pirates at sea can deliver suspects for trial and incarceration is 
essential. However, addressing legal impediments to combating piracy fails to 
address the conditions from which piracy emerged. 
Multinational naval patrols should be continued, sensitive to seasonal fl uxes 
in pirate attacks and acknowledging the limited ability of these warships to pro-
tect the tens of thousands of merchant vessels that transit the region on a yearly 
basis. However, such a method should recognize the limitations of a solely sea-
based approach to countering piracy, as it targets the symptoms of instability 
and is no substitute for enhanced regional maritime capacity and law and order 
on land in Somalia. Multinational naval patrols may also be unsustainable over 
the long term.
However ill advised and improbable it may be in practice, a credible threat 
of kinetic military action on land could encourage pirates to reduce their at-
tacks to a pre-2008 level that might not draw the attention of the international 
community. If actually put in practice, a U.S. attack on Somali pirate bases or 
an outright invasion might address some of the conditions that allowed piracy 
to emerge, but at the cost of increasing the level of intensity of the insurgency 
in Somalia as a whole. Therefore, this method should be avoided in spite of its 
potential to address the security and governance gap in Somalia.
Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity is an important 
area for international engagement, since regional states must eventually bear 
some of the burden of maritime security in their region under any long-term 
counterpiracy strategy. Specifi cally, East African and Persian Gulf states should 
continue regional maritime security cooperation supported by international 
partners. The goal would be to harmonize regional maritime coordination ef-
forts by sharing information regarding suspicious activity and conducting joint 
patrols with the support of nonregional partners. Like the multinational naval 
patrols, this method is limited by the fact that it only targets the symptoms of 
instability. However, it is possible that over the long term increased maritime se-
curity in the Horn of Africa could lessen seaborne threats that have contributed 
to lawlessness on land in Somalia, such as illegal fi shing and arms traffi cking.
Although the methods above can contribute greatly to the eventual success 
of the counterpiracy campaign, a truly comprehensive and sustainable counter-
piracy strategy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean must address the security 
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vacuum on land in Somalia that has created the conditions that allow piracy 
to thrive. While UN boots on the ground are increasingly unlikely, the inter-
national community should continue to support the Djibouti Agreement, al-
though it is arguably handicapped by its lack of inclusivity.86 As an alternative, 
the international community could encourage a new round of peace talks, advo-
cating maximum practical participation, encouraging clans and factions to buy 
in to a peaceful Somalia where law and order thrive. More inclusive peace talks 
may in fact be a prerequisite to any reduction in violence in Somalia, and they 
could provide the space necessary to address the governance vacuum.
Flaws notwithstanding, it is crucial that the international community sup-
port initiatives such as AMISOM with a strong and sustained commitment to 
provide fi nancing, training, and equipment, since it is an attempt to create and 
sustain an African peacekeeping force whose mere existence is at the very least a 
positive development for African regional security. Stronger international sup-
port may make African countries that have pledged troops but have not sent 
them more willing to do so. Although peacekeeping is by no means nation 
building, the presence of a suffi ciently trained and equipped peacekeeping force 
could contribute to an environment amenable to political, social, and economic 
development in Somalia.
In any long-term diplomatic or military engagement with Somalia, the inter-
national community will have to decide how best to deal with nonstate entities 
in Somalia. It should be open to abandoning the notion of a unifi ed Somali state 
in order to accommodate entities like Somaliland, which declared independence 
from Somalia in 1991, and Puntland, which declared its autonomy in 1998. So-
malia as it stands now does not act like a state; for the international community 
to engage with Somalia as it would with a state presents more complexities than 
can be managed in the current security and humanitarian situation. In particu-
lar, the United States and its international partners should weigh the costs and 
benefi ts of dealing directly, on a case-by-case basis, with legitimate and effective 
local authorities within Somalia, regardless of their affi liation or lack thereof 
with the Somali government. In the long run, these alternative identities and 
centers of authority may prove capable of providing law and order in Somalia in 
a way that a central government has been unable to do for two decades.87 Select-
ing local authorities for engagement could, admittedly, intensify competition 
among them and undermine the authority of the TFG; nonetheless, an adept 
and culturally sensitive engagement strategy may reveal that state and nonstate 
authorities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
As a precaution, any support the United States gives to Somalia should not 
be too overt, as it could backfi re, empowering hard-liners and reversing gains in 
governance and security. On one hand, Somali president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed 
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needs external support to maintain the TFG’s current position; on the other hand, 
he needs broad support within Somalia if his government is to be successful. If he 
relies too much on the former, it will compromise his success with the latter.88
In the end, by addressing the security and governance vacuum in Somalia by 
building local and regional capacity through a long-term multinational com-
mitment, the United States and international partners may be able to assist in 
eliminating insecurity on land and the resultant insecurity at sea that has mani-
fested itself in the recent spike in pirate attacks. The key to success in countering 
piracy off the coast of Somalia lies in conceptually linking the positive elements 
of current sea-based counterpiracy methods with approaches designed to rem-
edy the underlying instability ashore that produced piracy in the fi rst place.
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